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Abstract— We consider a model for secrecy generation, with
three terminals, by means of public interterminal communication,
and examine the problem of characterizing all the rates at
which all three terminals can generate a “secret key,” and
– simultaneously – two designated terminals can generate a
“private key” which is effectively concealed from the remaining
terminal; both keys are also concealed from an eavesdropper that
observes the public communication. Inner and outer bounds for
the “secret key–private key capacity region” are derived. Under
a certain special condition, these bounds coincide to yield the
(exact) secret key–private key capacity region.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of secret key generation by multiple terminals,
based on their observations of distinct correlated sources
followed by public communication among themselves, has
been investigated by several authors ([6], [1], [2], [8], [9],
[10], [4], [11], [12], [13], [14], among others). It has been
shown that these terminals can generate common randomness
which is kept secret from an eavesdropper that is privy to
the public interterminal communication, and sometimes also
to a wiretapped source which is correlated with the previous
sources.
In the wake of [6], [1], models for secrecy generation by
multiple terminals have been widely studied. Of particular
interest to us is recent work in [5], which considers a model
consisting of an arbitrary number of terminals that respectively
observe the distinct components of a discrete memoryless mul-
tiple source (DMMS) followed by unrestricted public commu-
nication among themselves; a subset of the terminals can also
serve as “helpers” for the remaining terminals in generating
secrecy. Three varieties of secrecy capacity – the largest rate
of secrecy generation – are considered according to the extent
of an eavesdropper’s knowledge: secret key, private key and
wiretap secret key capacity. A secret key (SK) generated by
a set of “user” terminals with assistance – in the form of
additional correlated information – from a set of helper termi-
nals (e.g., centralized or trusted servers in a key establishment
protocol), requires concealment from an eavesdropper with
access to the public interterminal communication. A private
key (PK) generated by the user terminals must be additionally
protected from the assisting helper terminals. A wiretap secret
key1 must satisfy the even more stringent requirement of
being protected from a resourceful eavesdropper’s access to
a wiretapped correlated source. It should be mentioned that
in all of the work mentioned above, the user terminals are
required to devise only a single key, of any variety, to be used
subsequently for secure encrypted communication.
There are, however, situations, arising for instance in “group
communication,” in which multiple keys must be simultane-
ously devised in a coordinated manner by different groups
of terminals (with possible overlaps of groups); such keys
need protection from prespecified terminals as also from an
eavesdropper. For instance, in group communication, different
groups of terminals (with possible overlaps of groups) must
generate different keys for encrypted communication within
those groups. A key devised for a group must be concealed
from terminals outside that group as well as from an eaves-
dropper. Such “group-wide” keys can be simultaneously de-
vised in a coordinated manner by different groups of terminals.
Separate keys for different groups are also needed when certain
disabled terminals become unauthorized or unreliable so that
the keys assigned to them, in effect, are compromised; to
maintain security, the remaining authorized terminals must
then switch to another set of keys which are concealed from
the disabled terminals. In the interests of efficiency, all such
keys must be devised at the outset of operations so as to
avoid the need for a fresh key generation procedure after a
disablement.
In general, in a network with m terminals, we could have
one (common) secret key for all the terminals, and private keys
for every proper subset of the m terminals. These situations
produce a rich vein of secrecy generation problems, the
information-theoretic underpinnings of which are substantial
enough for investigation already in the case of just three
terminals. The first work on the simultaneous generation of
multiple keys is [15], in which the problem of generating two
PKs for two different groups of user terminals is investigated.
In this paper, we consider a simple model with three
terminals and examine the problem of characterizing all the
1The capacity problem associated with a wiretap secret key is not fully
resolved even in the case of two user terminals, and we do not consider it
here.
rates at which the following two types of keys can be generated
simultaneously: (i) all the three terminals generate a SK,
which is effectively concealed from an eavesdropper; and
(ii) a designated pair of terminals generate a PK, which is
effectively concealed from the remaining terminal as well as
the eavesdropper. Suppose that terminals X , Y and Z observe,
respectively, the distinct components of a DMMS, i.e., inde-
pendent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) repetitions of the
generic random variables (rvs) X , Y , Z , respectively. The
terminals are permitted unrestricted communication among
themselves over a public channel, and all the transmissions are
observed by all the terminals. An eavesdropper has access to
this public communication too, but gathers no additional (wire-
tapped) side-information; also, the eavesdropper is passive,
i.e., unable to corrupt the transmissions. Terminals X , Y and
Z generate a SK, which is concealed from the eavesdropper
with access to the public communication among the terminals.
Also, terminals X and Y generate a PK, with the possible help
of terminal Z , which is concealed from the helper terminal Z
and from the eavesdropper. The set of all rate pairs at which
such (SK, PK) pairs can be generated is called (SK, PK)-
capacity region.
Our main technical results are inner and outer bounds for
the (SK, PK)-capacity region. Under a special condition, these
bounds coincide to yield the (exact) capacity region.
II. STATEMENT OF RESULTS
Consider a DMMS with three components corresponding
to generic rvs X , Y , Z , with finite alphabets X , Y , Z .
Let Xn = (X1, · · · , Xn), Y n = (Y1, · · · , Yn), Zn =
(Z1, · · · , Zn) be n i.i.d. repetitions of the rvs X , Y , Z . The
terminals X , Y , Z 2 respectively observe the components
Xn, Y n, Zn of the DMMS (Xn, Y n, Zn), where n denotes
the observation length. The terminals can communicate with
each other through broadcasts over a noiseless public channel,
possibly interactively in many rounds. Following [5], we
assume, without loss of generality, that these transmissions
occur in consecutive time slots in r rounds; the communication
is depicted by 3r rvs F1, · · · , F3r, where Ft denotes the
transmission in time slot t, 1 ≤ t ≤ 3r, by a terminal assigned
an index i = t mod 3, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, with terminals X , Y , Z
corresponding to indices 1, 2, 3, respectively. In general, Ft is
allowed to be any function, defined in terms of a mapping ft,
of the observations at the terminal with index i, i = t mod 3,
and of the previous transmissions F[1,t−1] = (F1, · · · , Ft−1);
thus, for instance, F1 = f1(Xn), F2 = f2(Y n, F1), F3 =
f3(Z
n, F[1,2]), and so on. We do not permit any randomization
at the terminals; in particular, f1, · · · , f3r are deterministic
mappings. Let F = (F1, · · · , F3r) denote collectively all the
transmissions in the 3r time slots.
Given ε > 0 and the rvs U , V , we say that U is ε-
recoverable from V if Pr{U 6= f(V )} ≤ ε for some function
f(V ) of V (cf. [5]).
2The use of the same symbol for a terminal as well as for the alphabet of
its observations should not lead to any confusion.
The rvs KS , KP , which are functions of (Xn, Y n, Zn),
with finite ranges KS and KP , respectively, represent an ε-(SK,
PK) pair, where the SK is for all the terminals and the PK is
for terminals X , Y with privacy from terminal Z , achievable
with communication F, if:
• KS is ε-recoverable from each of (F, Xn), (F, Y n),
(F, Zn);
• KP is ε-recoverable from each of (F, Xn), (F, Y n);
• KS satisfies the secrecy condition and the uniformity
condition
1
n
I(KS ∧ F) ≤ ε; (1)
1
n
H(KS) ≥
1
n
log |KS | − ε;
and
• KP satisfies the secrecy condition and the uniformity
condition
1
n
I(KP ∧ F, Z
n) ≤ ε; (2)
1
n
H(KP) ≥
1
n
log |KP | − ε.
The conditions above thus mean that terminals X , Y and
Z generate a nearly uniformly distributed SK KS which
is concealed from an eavesdropper that observes the public
communication F. Simultaneously, based on the same public
communication, terminals X and Y generate a PK KP with
the terminal Z acting as helper (e.g., a “third-party” in a key
establishment protocol) by providing X , Y with additional
correlated information; this private key is nearly uniformly
distributed, and is concealed from an eavesdropper that ob-
serves the public communication F as well as from the helper
Z (hence, “private”). Note that the previous conditions readily
imply that KS and KP are “nearly” statistically independent.
Definition 1: A pair of nonnegative numbers (RS , RP )
constitute an achievable (SK, PK)-rate pair if for every ε > 0
and sufficiently large n, an ε-(SK, PK) pair (KS ,KP) is
achievable with suitable communication (with the number of
rounds possibly depending on n), such that 1
n
H (KS) ≥
RS − ε,
1
n
H (KP) ≥ RP − ε. The set of all achievable (SK,
PK)-rate pairs is the (SK, PK)-capacity region, denoted by
CSP .
Remarks:
1. Maurer [7] pointed out that the secrecy conditions (1) and
(2) were inadequate for cryptographic purposes, and should
be strengthened by omission of the factor 1
n
. While all our
achievability results below are presented in the “weak sense,”
they can be established in the stronger sense of [7] by using
the techniques developed in [10].
2. The (SK, PK)-capacity region CSP is a closed convex
set. Closedness is obvious from the definition, while convexity
follows from a time-sharing argument (cf. [3]).
3. If KP is set equal to a constant in the definition above,
i.e., only a (single) ε-SK is generated by terminals X , Y and
Z , then the entropy rate of such a secret key is called an
achievable SK-rate, and the largest achievable SK-rate is the
SK-capacity. It is known [5] that the SK-capacity is equal to
min
{
I(X ∧ Y, Z), I(Y ∧X,Z), I(Z ∧X,Y ),
1
2 [H(X) +H(Y ) +H(Z)−H(X,Y, Z)]
}
. (3)
4. If KS is set equal to a constant in the definition above,
i.e., only a (single) ε-PK is generated by terminals X and Y
with terminal Z serving as a helper terminal, then the entropy
rate of such a private key is called an achievable PK-rate, and
the largest achievable PK-rate is the PK-capacity. It is known
(cf. [1], [4]) that the PK-capacity is equal to
I(X ∧ Y |Z). (4)
Example 1: Let X and Y be independent rvs, each uniformly
distributed on {0, 1}. Let Z = X ⊕ Y , where ⊕ denotes
addition modulo 2.
It is easily seen from (3) that the SK-capacity for the terminals
X , Y , Z equals 12 , and from (4) that the PK-capacity for
the terminals X , Y , with privacy from Z , equals 1. We
claim in this elementary example that 1 bit of perfect SK
(i.e., ε-SK with ε = 0) is achievable for all the terminals,
with observation length n = 2, using the following scheme.
Terminals X , Y , Z , with respective observations (X1, X2),
(Y1, Y2), (Z1, Z2), transmit X1, Y2 and Z1⊕Z2, respectively.
Then each terminal can perfectly recover all the observations
of the other terminals. The secret key KS is set to be X2 (or
Y1 or Z1 or Z2). It can be shown that
I(KS ∧ F) = I(X2 ∧X1, Y2, Z1 ⊕ Z2) = 0,
and
H(KS) = 1.
On the other hand, 1 bit of perfect PK is achievable for
terminals X and Y , with privacy from Z , for observation
length n = 1. When terminal Z transmits F = Z1, terminal
X can perfectly recover Y1, which is set to be KP . It is clear
that
I(KP ∧ F, Z
n) = 0,
and
H(KP) = 1.
Using a time-sharing argument, every (SK, PK)-rate pair
(RS , RP) satisfying
2RS +RP ≤ 1 (5)
is perfectly achievable. The results in this paper (cf. Theorem
1 below) will show that the secret key-private key capacity
region CSP for this example cannot be larger than the region
in (5), so that (5) characterizes the capacity region CSP .
For notational simplicity, we set
A
△
= I(Z ∧X,Y ),
B
△
= min {I(X ∧ Y, Z), I(Y ∧X,Z)} ,
C
△
=
1
2
[H(X) +H(Y ) +H(Z)−H(X,Y, Z)],
Thus, the SK-capacity (3) for the terminals X , Y , Z is equal
to min{A,B,C}.
Theorem 1 (Outer bound for CSP ): Let (RS , RP) be an
achievable (SK, PK)-rate pair. Then
RS ≤ A, (6)
RP ≤ I(X ∧ Y |Z), (7)
RS +RP ≤ B, (8)
2RS +RP ≤ 2C. (9)
Remark: The bounds (6), (7) on the individual largest achiev-
able SK- and PK-rates are obvious from (3) and (4). Also,
while (3) implies
RS ≤ B, RS ≤ C,
note that the conditions (8), (9) above are more stringent than
(3).
Theorem 2 (Inner bound for CSP ): The (SK, PK)-capacity
region CSP is inner-bounded by the region

(RS , RP) :
min{A,B,C}−min{I(X∧Z),I(Y ∧Z)}
I(X∧Y |Z) · RP
+RS ≤ min{A,B,C},
RP ≤ I(X ∧ Y |Z)

 .
(10)
Remark: The proof of Theorem 2 is based on the fol-
lowing idea: a modified version of the random binning
technique developed in [5] is first used to generate the
needed “common randomness.” A SK and a PK, of rate pair
(min {I(X ∧ Z), I(Y ∧ Z)} , I(X ∧ Y |Z)) are then extracted
from this common randomness, by a means from [5]. An
application of the time-sharing technique then leads to the
achievability of the region in (10). Although interterminal
communication between X , Y , Z is permitted, the region in
(10) is shown to be achieved by a single autonomous trans-
mission from each terminal based on its own local observation
of its component of the DMMS.
Under a certain condition, the outer bound in Theorem 1
coincides with the inner bound in Theorem 2, which provides
a characterization of the (SK, PK)-capacity region CSP .
Theorem 3: If min{A,B,C} = B, then CSP equals the
set of pairs (RS , RP) satisfying (7) and (8).
Example 2: Let X , Y and Z be three rvs, each uniformly
distributed on {0, 1}, and satisfying the Markov condition Y −
◦−X −◦−Z . Further, suppose that
PXY (x, y) =
1− p
2
δx,y +
p
2
(1− δx,y),
PXZ(x, z) =
1− q
2
δx,z +
q
2
(1 − δx,z),
where 0 < q < p < 12 and
δx,y =
{
0, if x 6= y,
1, if x = y.
PR
h (p+q−2pq)−h (p)bb
RS
1−h (p)b1−h (p+q−2pq)b
Fig. 1. CSP for Example 2.
Straightforward calculations show that
A = I(Z ∧X,Y ) = 1− h(q),
B = min{I(X ∧ Y, Z), I(Y ∧X,Z)} = 1− h(p),
and
C =
1
2
[H(X)+H(Y )+H(Z)−H(X,Y, Z)] = 1−
h(p) + h(q)
2
,
where h(p) = −p log2 p − (1 − p) log2(1 − p) is the binary
entropy function. Since 0 < q < p < 12 , we have that
min{A,B,C} = B. It follows from Theorem 3 that CSP is
the set of pairs (RS , RP) satisfying
RP ≤ h(p+ q − 2pq)− h(p),
RS +RP ≤ 1− h(p).
This region is depicted in Fig. 1.
Remarks: Although we have shown the tightness of the outer
bound for CSP under the condition min{A,B,C} = B, it
remains open as to whether this outer bound is tight in general.
To prove its tightness, it would suffice to show the tightness
of the outer bound under the condition min{A,B,C} =
min{A,C}. Since the case A < B < C can be easily seen
to be impossible, two remaining cases are relevant, and these
are unresolved to date.
Case 1: min{A,B,C} = C: Under this condition, the
constraint (6) is implied by the constraint (9). Thus, the
outer bound for the (SK, PK)-capacity region is given by the
constraints (7), (8) and (9), and is depicted in Fig. 2. By a time-
sharing argument, to show the achievability of this region, it
suffices to show that (SK, PK)-rate pairs (0, I(X ∧ Y |Z)),
(C, 0),
(min {I(X ∧ Z), I(Y ∧ Z)} , I(X ∧ Y |Z)) ,
and
(max{I(X ∧Z), I(Y ∧Z)}, B−max{I(X ∧Z), I(Y ∧Z)})
(11)
are all achievable. While the first three (SK, PK)-rate pairs
are known to be achievable, it is unclear if the achievability
of (SK, PK)-rate pair (11) holds.
I(X     Y|Z)
B A
B
R S
R   = AS
R  +R   = BPS
R   = I(X   Y|Z)P
2R  +R   = 2C   S
min{I(X    Z), I(Y     Z)}
2
RP
2C
P
I(X    Z)+I(Y     Z)
C
max{I(X    Z), I(Y     Z)}
Outer bound
Inner
bound
B−max{I(X    Z), I(Y     Z)}
Fig. 2. Inner and outer bounds for CSP for Case 1.
Case 2: A < C ≤ B: The outer bound for the (SK, PK)-
capacity region under this condition is depicted in Fig. 3. To
show that this region is achievable, it suffices to show the
achievability of (SK, PK)-rate pairs (0, I(X ∧ Y |Z)), (A, 0),
(min {I(X ∧ Z), I(Y ∧ Z)} , I(X ∧ Y |Z)) ,
(max{I(X∧Z), I(Y ∧Z)}, B−max{I(X∧Z), I(Y ∧Z)}),
(12)
and
(I(Z ∧X,Y ), I(X ∧ Y )− I(Z ∧X,Y )) . (13)
While the achievability of the first three (SK, PK)-rate pairs
can be shown, it remains unclear whether (SK, PK)-rate pairs
(12) and (13) are achievable.
III. DISCUSSION
Inner and outer bounds are derived for the (SK, PK)-
capacity region for a model for secrecy generation with
three terminals, each of which observes a distinct component
of a discrete memoryless multiple source, with unrestricted
public communication allowed among these terminals. Under
a certain condition, these bounds coincide to yield the (SK,
PK)-capacity region.
An obvious generalization of our model above is one in
which a secret key is generated by all three terminals, and –
simultaneously – all three pairs of terminals generate distinct
private keys, each of which is effectively concealed from
the remaining terminal. Entropy rates of these simultaneously
generated secret key and private keys constitute a (SK, 3-
PK)-rate quadruple. The set of all achievable (SK, 3-PK)-rate
quadruples is called (SK, 3-PK)-capacity region. Following
arguments similar to those used in the proof of Theorem 1,
we can also obtain an outer bound for this (SK, 3-PK)-capacity
I(X     Y|Z)
B
B
R S
R  +R   = BPS
C
min{I(X    Z), I(Y     Z)}
2
R   = AS
R   = I(X   Y|Z)P
2R  +R   = 2C   S P
A
RP
2C
I(X     Y)−I(Z     X,Y)
I(X    Z)+I(Y     Z)
max{I(X    Z), I(Y     Z)}
Outer bound
Inner
bound
B−max{I(X    Z), I(Y     Z)}
Fig. 3. Inner and outer bounds for CSP for Case 2.
region. Achievability proofs leading to inner bounds for this
(SK, 3-PK)-capacity region are under investigation.
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